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In 1964, a labour agreement was signed between the governments of South Africa and Portugal on 
behalf of its colony, Mozambique, to regulate the migration of Mozambican mineworkers to South 
African mines. In terms of this agreement the Mozambican mineworkers who received income on 
the South African mines were exempt from any taxes on their South African source income. 
Although outdated, the agreement is still in force today and is used by the South African mines to 
enter into employment contracts with Mozambican mineworkers.  
 
Many countries in the SADC region enter into double taxation agreements for the avoidance of 
double taxation. The 1964 labour agreement is quite unique as the income received by the 
Mozambican mineworkers is exempt from tax in South Africa for the duration of the contract 
(usually up to 18 months) entered into by the Mozambican mineworkers and their South African 
employers although the source of income is in South Africa. The challenge is whether this agreement 
should continue as an international agreement and whether it is discriminatory to exempt these 
mineworkers when compared to other mineworkers in the same position working in South Africa.  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the application of this labour agreement with reference to 
the South African Income Tax Act and the double tax agreement with Mozambique.  It further 
questions whether this agreement causes a revenue loss and whether or not such loss is justifiable.  
It further tests whether this agreement is a tax incentive and whether or not it leads to harmful tax 
competition in violation of the SADC agreement.  Finally, the agreement is assessed in light of the 
discrimination article in the double tax agreement and based on section 9 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa.  
 
The main conclusion is whether the 1964 labour agreement should continue as an international 
agreement in the present circumstances as the agreement is fairly outdated and subject to various 
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1.  Introduction and Background 
 
The migration of workers from Mozambique to South Africa started before the discovery of 
diamonds and gold on the mines at Kimberley and the Witwatersrand. The first workers came to 
Natal to work on the sugar and other estates from the 1850s. With the discovery of diamonds in 
Kimberly in the 1860s it attracted Mozambican workers to South Africa. It is estimated that there 
were up to 12000 Mozambicans working in South Africa in 1879.1 
 
In Mozambique factors such as climate changes, economic conditions and a turbulent political and 
social environment contributed to the migrant labour system of Mozambican workers to South 
Africa. With the discovery of gold in the 1880s on the Witwatersrand it accelerated the participation 
of the Mozambican workers in the migrant labour system.2 
 
A brief review of Portuguese capitalism and colonialism in Mozambique will help to explain 
Portuguese policy towards the migrant labour system of Mozambican workers to South Africa. 
Portugal began to occupy Mozambique after the Conference of Berlin (1884-1885). The Portuguese 
economy was weak and it struggled to control and exploit most of the vast territory of Mozambique. 
As a result the Portuguese gave up some of their rights to exploit this vast territory to concessionary 
or monopolistic companies. These companies had the foreign capital. The Niassa Company (northern 
Mozambique) and the Mozambique Company (in provinces of the centre of the country) were some 
of the main companies. The foreign capital of these companies was financed by the French, 
Germans, Belgians and the British. These companies offered work to the local labour on plantations 
and in their enterprises. The British threatened to occupy Southern Mozambique where the 
Portuguese had control of the territory. The weakness of Portuguese capital investment and the 
political instability forced the Portuguese to negotiate agreements with the British as they were 
dependent on its capital. In this way the Portuguese maintained their investment and local labour in 
Southern Mozambique.3 
 
                                                             
1 Gasper, N. 2006. The reduction of Mozambican workers in South African Mines, 1975 – 1992: A case study of 
the consequences for Gaza Province – District of Chibuto. [Online]. Available. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10539/4839 [16 May 2008] : 16 -34 
2
 ibid footnote 1 
3
 ibid footnote 1 
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After the Portuguese effectively took control of Southern Mozambique in 1897 it signed agreements 
with the South African government to take advantage of the current migrant labour system of 
Mozambican workers to South Africa.4 
This was important to the Portuguese colonial regime as it contributed to the economy in Southern 
Mozambique. 5 
 
To further their control of the movement of workers from Mozambique to South Africa, the 
Portuguese government instituted the Regulations for Employment of Native Mozambicans in the 
South African Republic (Transvaal) in November 1897. As a result of these regulations, the 
registration and movement of these migrant workers came effectively under the control of the 
Portuguese colonial officials. 6 
 
The Anglo- Boer war started in 1899. This had negative effects on the mining industry in South 
Africa. It resulted in the ceasing of mining activities and the repatriation of thousands of 
Mozambican mineworkers to Mozambique. In December 1901 the Portuguese colonial government 
and South Africa signed a treaty called the Modus Vivendi.  The Modus Vivendi included agreements 
in respect of migrant labour, railways and ports, and trade. The length of the contract for 
Mozambican workers on South African mines was established as 12 months. The Mozambican 
worker could renew the contract if they wished. Also in 1901 an agreement was signed between the 
Mozambican authorities and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA). In terms of 
this agreement WENELA was recognised as the sole recruiter in Mozambique.7  
 
A new convention was signed between the colonial government of Mozambique and the 
government of Transvaal in 1909. It replaced the Modus Vivendi of 1901. 8 
The convention established 12 months as the duration of the contract which is similar to the Modus 
Vivendi but the issue of re-engagement was revised as stipulated in Article VI of the convention 
which read as follows: 
‘No labourer shall be engaged in the first instance for a longer period than one year, but at 
the end of the first period he may be re-engaged for a further period or periods, but so that 
such period or periods, together with the first period, shall not, without the special  
                                                             
4 ibid footnote 1 
5 ibid footnote 1 
6 ibid footnote 1 
7
 ibid footnote 1 
8
 ibid footnote 1 
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permission of the Portuguese Curator hereinafter referred to, exceed two years. Any labourer 
who fails to return to the Province of Mozambique at the expiration of this period of service, 
including any period of re-engagement, shall, unless he shall have obtained special 
permission from the Curator, be considered a clandestine immigrant for all the purposes of 
this Convention.’9 
The convention of 1909 stipulates that no pressure would be put on the Mozambican workers to 
renew their contracts.10  
 
In 1928 the convention was again renewed, now between the government of the Union of South 
Africa and the Portuguese government. The convention solved some of the problems in previous 
agreements signed between the two governments in respect of the duration of the contract of the 
Mozambican workers and deferred pay. In the 1928 convention, 12 months was established as the 
period of the employment contract and it could be renewed for a further six months. Deferred pay 
which was voluntary in the previous convention was now seen as compulsory. The deferred pay 
which was a significant part of the wages of the Mozambican workers would be paid to Mozambique 
in escudos (their local currency).11 
 
The monopoly achieved by WENELA in recruitment of Mozambican workers was one of the 
outcomes that came out of the agreements between the two governments. Recruitment by WENELA 
started in 1902 and ended in the middle of the 1960s. WENELA was only allowed to recruit in the 
areas of Southern Mozambique.12 
 
WENELA’s annual recruitment in terms of the convention and subsequent amendments to it was  
100 000 workers in 1929, 80 000 workers from 1933 to 1935 (this was due to the depression). 
Annual recruitment rose to 100 000 workers in 1940 – 1964. After that quotas were fixed at 65 000 
workers.13 
 
                                                             
9 ibid footnote 1 
10 ibid footnote 1 
11 ibid footnote 1 
12 ibid footnote 1 






In 1964 a new agreement or labour treaty was made with the government of Portugal on behalf of 
its colonial dependency (the Province of Mozambique)14 carrying forward some of the principles 
from the 1928 Convention. The 1964 Agreement maintained arrangements with WENELA. 
The new agreement came into operation on the 1st of January 1965 and stipulated that the number 
of workers from the province of Mozambique to be employed by the mines in South Africa would be 
mutually agreed upon between the two governments.15 
 
 
1.1 Analysis of Mozambican Mineworkers in South Africa 
 
‘The Mozambican labour component in South African mines was clearly significant in terms of 
numbers of workers from the beginning of the mining industry to the middle 1970s.‘16 
 
The table below is a comparative analysis of South African and Mozambican workers which shows 
that national labour clearly dropped while the Mozambican labour component employed in South 
African mines rose from 1946/47 to the end of the 1950s. The Mozambican workers did not follow 
South African workers into secondary industry because their contracts were dependent on treaties 
between South Africa and Mozambique.17 
 
The Mozambican workers received by mines, 1920 – 1975 (selected by years) 
Table 1 
 Mozambicans Total of miners 
received by mines 
(%) 
1920 76,370 211,838 36 
1928 66,094 200,202 33 
1929 60,831 199,704 30 
1930 56,258 230,892 33 
1932 39,129 210,341 19 
1934 50,665 243,212 21 
                                                             
14 ibid footnote 13 
15 Labour Agreement, No.11/1964 
16 Gasper, N. 2006. The reduction of Mozambican workers in South African Mines, 1975 – 1992: A case study of 
the consequences for Gaza Province – District of Chibuto. [Online]. Available http://hdl.handle.net/10539/4839 
[16 May 2008]: 16 -34 
17
 ibid footnote 16 
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1936 70,092 308,860 23 
1942 74,507 310,406 24 
1946 74,117 297,231 25 
1947 78,308 295,486 27 
1949 82,636 328,042 25 
1951 89,243 325,834 27 
1954 86,103 349,454 25 
1959 81,673 425,378 19 
1960 79,065 426,951 19 
1970 93,773 357,972 26 
1973 74,759 352,362 21 
1974 86,324 319,974 27 
1975 113,484 451,514 25 
 
The table below shows the number of foreign workers from Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Botswana employed by South African gold, platinum, and coal mines from 1996 – 2011: 
 
Table 2 
 Mozambique Swaziland Lesotho Botswana 
1996 55,022 14,371 81,357 7,932 
1997 55,027 12,960 76,360 7,536 
1998 52,011 10,338 60,450 6,223 
1999 46,890 9,307 52,436 5,139 
2000 44,014 8,160 51,351 4,343 
2001 45,254 7,794 49,599 3,651 
2002 50,589 8,587 54,390 3,551 
2003 52,205 7,885 54,202 4,246 
2004 48,099 7,521 48,437 3,923 
2005 46,256 6,878 43,693 3,257 
2006 46,709 7,124 46,082 2,992 
2007 44,879 7,099 45,608 2,845 
2008 - 2010 Data missing Data missing Data missing Data missing 




‘During most of the period, there were steep decreases in the number of Swazi, Basotho and 
Botswana, but there was only a marginal decrease in the number of Mozambicans. A possible 
explanation for this could be the fact that the BLS bilateral agreements (Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Botswana) provided for the recruitment of contract labourers subject to the availability of South 
African labour. The bilateral labour agreement between South Africa and Mozambique however 
does not contain such a provision.’18 With the comparison between Lesotho and Mozambique there 




1.2 The 1964 labour agreement 
 
The 1964 agreement stipulates that the recruitment of workers in Mozambique would only be 
undertaken by an organisation or organisations duly approved by the Authority of the Province of 
Mozambique and of the Republic of South Africa.19 
 
‘Three recruitment agencies – Albano Domingos (ALGOS), Agência de Trabalhadores para  a África do 
Sul (ATAS) and Companhia Angariadora de Mão de Obra Nacional (CAMON) – were allowed to 
recruit in Mozambique through the agreement of 1964; however, unlike WENELA, these new 
recruitment agencies were licensed to supply labour to mines not affiliated to the Chamber of Mines 
and to other economic sectors such as agriculture.’20 
 
‘The employment contracts of the Mozambican mineworkers provided provisions relating to the 
rights and obligations between the recruiting organisation representing the workers and the 
affiliated mines.21 The employment contracts were entered into for a period of twelve months (313 
shifts worked), but the workers were entitled to enter into new contracts, or to extend or to renew 
their contracts for a period or periods not exceeding six months. The maximum period of service was 
to not exceed eighteen months. The period of the employment contract was calculated from the 
date the worker arrives at the place of employment, and the period of extension or of renewal from 
                                                             
18 Truen, S. & Chisadza, S. 2012. The South Africa – SADC Remittance Channel. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.finmark.org.za/blog/publication/the-south-africa-sadc-remittance-channel-2/ [February 2012] 
19 Labour Agreement, No.11/1964 
20 Gasper, N. 2006. The reduction of Mozambican workers in South African Mines, 1975 – 1992: A case study of 
the consequences for Gaza Province – District of Chibuto. [Online]. Available. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10539/4839 [16 May 2008]: 16 -34 
21
 ibid footnote 20 
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the day following the one on which the previous contract expired, even if the further contract was 
signed on a subsequent date.’22 These implications remain as the agreement remains in force.  
In some instances the Mozambican mineworkers may enter into employment contracts with 
extensions beyond eighteen months due to the poor drafting of the 1964 labour agreement. It can 
be said that these employment contracts will fall outside the scope of the 1964 labour agreement. 
  
The 1964 agreement provides certain provisions for compensation in the event of occupational 
injury and extended employment contracts with the approval of both the Delegate of the Institute of 
Labour and the South African authorities. 23  
 
The Institute of Labour provides protection and assistance to the Mozambican mineworkers in South 
Africa.24  The Institute of Labour is still in operation and has its offices in Johannesburg. The Labour 
Delegate still oversees the interests of Mozambican mineworkers on South African mines. 25 
 
1.3 Bilateral treaties 
 
The first democratic government of South Africa in 1994 inherited a series of bilateral labour 
agreements governing mine migration with the governments of Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, 
Swaziland and Malawi. These treaties gave the South African mining industry privileged recruiting 
access to non-South African labour outside the terms of the Aliens Control Act (now repealed).26 
Under the new Immigration Act, 2002, the mineworkers working under bilateral treaties would not 
be affected when applying their trade in South Africa. 27 
 
Through the economic power of the mining industry it was able to persuade the governments of the 
day to give them special dispensations to operate their system outside the normal immigration rules 
and regulations. As a result, the South African government signed a series of bilateral labour treaties 
                                                             
22 Labour Agreement, No.11/1964 




24 ibid footnote 22 
25 Panapress..available: http://www.panapress.com/Mozambique-sacks-Labour-Rep-in-South-Africa--13-
574980-17-lang2-index.html 
26 Crush, J. 1997.Contract Migration to South Africa: Past Present and Future. available: 
http://www.queesu.ca/samp/transform/Crush.htm 
27




with the major supplier States. The treaties, although still in force, are all old agreements dating, in 
their current form, back to the 1960s and early 1970s. The treaties set the terms and conditions of 
access by contract workers (mainly miners) to the South African labour market. The employment 
contracts for mineworkers from Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi are subject 
to the conditions laid out in these treaties.  
 
‘The treaties specify a series of conditions and obligations on the part of both South Africa and the 
source countries on the following issues:28 
• recruitment - including right to recruit, length of contract, length of time between contracts, 
quotas, payment of recruiting fees, the need for written contracts, and provision of facilities 
for recruiting and processing contracts; 
• contracts - including identification of employer and employee, home address of recruit, 
place of employment, contract length, minimum wage, food and in-kind provision by 
employer, transport to and from work, and written contracts;  
• remittances and deferred pay - provision for compulsory deduction of a proportion of wages 
and transfer to the home country; 
• taxation - exempting contract workers from paying tax in South Africa; 
• documentation - including valid contracts, passports and vaccination certificates; 
endorsement in passport to show purpose and period of entry; employment record books; 
• unemployment insurance; 
• length of agreements; and 
• appointment of labour officials to be stationed in South Africa. The labour offices are 
nominally responsible for inter alia "protecting the interests of workers", registration of 
undocumented workers, transfer of money, providing information on conditions of 
employment; and consulting with the South African government on repatriation of sick or 
destitute workers.’29 
 
‘The Malawi agreement appears to have lapsed since the expulsion of Malawian miners from the 
industry in 1986.’30 ‘The treaty with Mozambique was actually signed by the Portuguese colonial 
government. There is no official bilateral [labour] treaty between South Africa and Zimbabwe.’31 ‘In 
                                                             
28 ibid footnote 26 
29 Crush, J. 1997.Contract Migration to South Africa: Past Present and Future. available: 
http://www.queesu.ca/samp/transform/Crush.htm 
30 Samp. N.D. 2005.Southern African Migration Programme. available: 
http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/policy.html 
31
 ibid footnote 29 
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other words no similar agreements existed with Zimbabwe.’ ‘Another reason was that Zimbabwe 
was always an episodic supplier of migrant labour to South Africa with numbers fluctuating over 
time. The Mugabe government then withdrew its workers at independence in 1981.’32 The treaties 
with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are still in operation. 
Contract migration to South Africa through bilateral labour treaties is governed by legislation. The 
Immigration Act of 2002 (as amended in 2004) which replaced the Aliens Control Act of 1991 
recognised these bilateral labour treaties. Through these treaties access is granted to unskilled 
labour from neighbouring states.33 Under the Labour Relations Act No.66 of 1995 these workers are 
recognised as employees regardless of the form of their employment contracts.  
 
Section 200A of the Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 list several factors34 that should be present 
for a person to be an employee. Most of these factors will apply to these workers. 
 
The 1964 labour treaty between South Africa and Mozambique makes provision to minimize the 
financial costs of migration to South Africa. This includes the exemption of Mozambican 
mineworkers to pay South African taxes.35 
 
Following South Africa’s transition into democracy, the 1964 labour treaty and similar labour treaties 
with BLS states are still in operation today to regulate the migration of mineworkers to South 
Africa.36 The provisions contained in the 1964 labour agreement poses several questions as to its 
relevance as an international agreement in South Africa today which are briefly explained as follows: 
• Its status as an international agreement should be established in the current South African 
legal system.  
                                                             
32
 ibid footnote 29 
33 Truen, S. & Chisadza, S. 2012. The South Africa – SADC Remittance Channel. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.finmark.org.za/blog/publication/the-south-africa-sadc-remittance-channel-2/ [February 2012] 
34 List of factors: (a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another 
person; (b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person; (c) in the case 
of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that organisation; (d) the person has 
worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month over the last three months;  (e) the 
person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or renders services; (f) the 
person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or (g) the person only works for 
or renders services to one person 
35 Reference: BAMU, PH.2014. An Analysis of SADC Migration Instruments in Light of ILO and UN Principles on 
Labour Migration. Available: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-addis_ababa/---ilo-
pretoria/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_239819.pdf 
36
 ibid footnote 35 
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• Whether the labour agreement overrides or prevents the application of the current DTC 
between South Africa and Mozambique removing the South African taxing right over South 
African source income. 
• Whether discrimination between nationals of South Africa and Mozambique in terms of the 
current Constitution of South Africa, 1996 and Article 24 of the OECD MTC arises. 
• Whether there is any revenue loss to South Africa due to the exemption of taxes provision in 
this agreement.  
• Whether the exemption for taxes provision can be considered to be a tax incentive that 
might lead to harmful tax competition in the SADC region.  
 
An important distinction to be made is between Mozambican mineworkers that entered into 
contracts for the first time (maximum of 18 months) and those that regularly renew their contracts 
(above 18 months). It is important to establish in which country the Mozambican mineworkers are 
resident for tax purposes. This will have a bearing on the correct taxation of these mineworkers. 
Furthermore, the Mozambican mineworkers have to be a resident of either Mozambique or South 
Africa to make use of the treaty benefits as per the DTC between South Africa and Mozambique. In 
respect of Mozambique the right to tax will be determined on residence of the Mozambican 
mineworkers. In respect of South Africa it would have a source claim for taxing these mineworkers 
and, if the mineworkers were also resident, a further claim based on residence. 
 
The South African Income Tax Act established two tests in the determination of residence for 
individuals. These are the ‘ordinarily resident’ and the ‘physical presence’ tests which will be 
discussed later. Article 4 of the OECD MTC stipulates that residence should be determined in 
accordance with domestic laws of the Contracting States. If it is established that the Mozambican 
mineworker is a resident of both South Africa and Mozambique then the tie-breaker tests should be 
applied to establish residence of the Mozambican mineworker to either of these countries for tax 
purposes. This will be discussed later. 
 
In the event that both Mozambique and South Africa tax the Mozambican mineworkers on their 
South African source income then the tax sparing clauses as stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 22 of 
the DTC between the two countries should be taken into account. This is necessary to establish 
whether there are any schemes between the two countries for the promotion of economic 
development. If this is the case then both South Africa and Mozambique may grant reductions or 
exemptions on taxes paid for foreign investors such as the Mozambican mineworkers which are 
11 
 
applying their trade in South Africa. It should further be established whether the 1964 labour 
agreement may be seen as a scheme for the promotion of economic development between the two 
countries.     
 
2. Research and Objectives 
 
This dissertation has as its principle aim to provide a critical evaluation of the 1964 preferential 
agreement (labour agreement) for Mozambique mineworkers in the light of the South Africa – 
Mozambique DTC and the SADC treaty. The dissertation will test whether SARS has applied this 
labour agreement correctly in the context of the SADC treaty and its founding objectives of forging 
links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration and the harmonisation of fiscal policies 
in relation to tax related matters between Member States. The dissertation will also examine the 
exemption granted from income tax in South Africa through this labour agreement and the effective 
provision in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (namely section 10(1)(c)(v)). Finally it will assess whether 
this agreement would create discrimination of the sort disallowed by the DTC network of South 
Africa. 
 
To achieve these aims, the following objectives must be met, namely:    
- To establish the status of this labour agreement in relation to the DTC between South Africa 
and Mozambique and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
- To assess whether such an agreement could be classified as harmful tax competition in 
terms of the treaty of the South African Development Community (SADC) States and 
therefore a violation of that treaty. 
- The monetary impact of the tax incentive will also be considered in light of the current tax 
threshold in South Africa against the remuneration received by the Mozambican workers to 
assess whether or not, in the absence of the labour treaty, such amounts paid would be 
taxable in South Africa. This will assess the relevance of the tax incentive against the South 
Africa – Mozambique DTC. 
- If the tax incentive remains taxable in the absence of the labour agreement, it is then 
necessary to assess whether this labour tax incentive would be in violation of the non - 
discrimination article of the South Africa – Mozambique DTC on the basis of nationality.  
 
It should be noted that the 1964 labour agreement between South Africa and Portugal regulating 
foreign migrant labour from Mozambique to South Africa impacts areas other than taxation. This 
12 
 
dissertation although highlighting the deficiencies on the application of this agreement in practice 
with respect to taxation does not conclude on how this agreement should be applied with respect to 
such other areas of Government or whether it should be continued or discontinued with respect to 
those other areas. 
 
3. The current legal status of the 1964 labour agreement 
 
The 1964 labour agreement’s status within the current South African legal system must first be 
determined. This analysis is necessary as the agreement was entered into during the apartheid 
government, prior to South Africa’s current Constitution and entered into with a colonial power on 
behalf of its colony. These factors all necessitate a review of the legal status of this international 
agreement in South Africa. 
 
3.1 Succession of treaties 
 
‘The transition from apartheid to democracy did not involve any change in the statehood of South 
Africa but simply a change of government. Consequently, as a matter of international law, it was 
unnecessary to provide for succession to treaties as a new government automatically succeeds to 
the rights and obligations of its predecessor. Despite this, the Interim Constitution contained a 
clause providing for succession to treaties ‘unless provided otherwise by an Act of Parliament’. This 
clause, which gave to Parliament the power to terminate treaties unilaterally, was strongly criticized 
by academic writers as being contrary to the procedures for termination prescribed by the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.37 The 1996 Constitution remedies this ‘lapse’ by providing 
that: 
‘The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic when the 
Constitution took effect’ (Section 231(4)). 
 
Therefore agreements/ treaties in force prior to the Constitution were brought across and remained 
effective. This would include the 1964 labour agreement between South Africa and Mozambique. 
There were no other agreements for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on 
income between South Africa and Portugal and South Africa and Mozambique prior to 1994, apart 
                                                             
37
 Dugard, J.2010. International Law: A South African Perspective: Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd:55 -59 
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from the 1957 agreement for the avoidance of double tax on income from the business of air and 
sea transport.38 
 
The 1964 labour agreement (no. 11/1964 – treaty series) had been approved in Parliament and 
published in the Government Gazette.39  
 
3.2 The constitution – Section 231 
 
Section 231 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 refers to the current process for 
the approval of treaties and their enactment into law. The authority to negotiate and sign 
international agreements is the responsibility of the executive which consists of the president and 
the cabinet. Agreements are only binding if they are approved by the National executive of Provinces 
as well as the National Assembly in parliament. 
 
Previously the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 1961 that pre-dates the current 
Constitution gave the State President the power to enter into and ratify international conventions, 
treaties and agreements in terms of section 7(g) of that Constitution.  
 
It is submitted that the 1964 labour agreement did not follow the same steps for ratification as 
stipulated in section 231(2) of the Constitution.  
 
3.3 The constitution: Section 232 & 233 
 
‘The South African common law which is a blend of Roman-Dutch and English common law adopts 
the monist approach to customary international law.40 In States with a monist system, international 
law does not need to be translated into national law. The act of ratifying an international treaty 
immediately incorporates that international law into national law. The International Criminal Court 
Statute, therefore, can be directly applied and adjudicated in national courts. “Monist systems” do 
differ in their approach. 
• Under some Constitutions direct incorporation of international obligations into the domestic 
law occur on ratification. 
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39 Confirmed from the resources at the SARS Library for research purposes as the agreement in its current 
format was approved in Parliament. 
40
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• In other States direct incorporation occurs only for self – executing treaties.’41 
 
‘Customary international law is part of South African law and courts are required to ‘ascertain and 
administer’ rules of customary international law without the need for proof of law – as occurs in the 
case of foreign law. As a species of common law, customary international law is, however, 
subordinate to all forms of legislation. The relationship between customary international law and 
municipal law described above was affirmed by South African courts on many occasions before 
1993.’42 
 
The customary international law is given constitutional endorsement by section 232 of the 1996 
Constitution which, in language substantially similar to the Interim Constitution,43 provides that:  
‘Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or 
an Act of Parliament.’ 
 
‘There can be little doubt that the “constitutionalisation” of this rule gives it additional weight.  
Moreover, customary international law is no longer subject to subordinate legislation. Only a 
provision of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament that is clearly inconsistent with customary 
international law will trump it.’44 
 
This is emphasized by section 233 of the Constitution, which provides that: 
‘When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.’ 
 
It is submitted that the 1964 labour agreement between South Africa and Portugal is a source of 
international law and is consistent with domestic legislation as stipulated in section 10(1)(c)(v) of the 
Act.  
 
As indicated previously in section 233 of the Constitution, the Act should be interpreted in a way 
that is consistent with South Africa’s double tax treaties, being a source of international law, unless 
this interpretation is unreasonable. Therefore, a court will be compelled to interpret the Act in such 
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Available:http://www.peacejusticeinitiative.org/implementation-resources/dualist-and-monist 
42 ibid footnote 40 
43
 Dugard, J.2010. International Law: A South African Perspective: Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd: 55 -56 
44
 ibid footnote 43 
15 
 
a way that taxation is limited in accordance with a treaty, unless this interpretation is unreasonable. 
In the CSARS v Tradehold case (132/11) (2012) ZASCA 61 a similar conclusion was reached where the 
DTA was relevant and took precedence over domestic rules where a conflict arose between the two.  
 
 
3.4 Enactment of the agreement by domestic law 
 
The ‘income’ of the Mozambican mineworker, as defined in section 1, is the amount of his gross 
income remaining after the deduction of any amounts exempt from normal tax for any year or 
period of assessment.45 
Exemptions can be divided in two broad terms namely partial exemptions and absolute exemptions. 
The salary received by the Mozambican worker will fall under the former (partial exemptions) as it is 
assumed that only the salary will be exempt from normal tax although the taxpayer may receive 
other forms of income that will be taxable. Under section 10(1) (c) of the Income Tax Act salaries 
(and amounts for services rendered, referred to as emoluments) payable to certain persons are 
exempt from normal tax in respect of: 
- ‘a subject of a foreign state who is temporarily employed in South Africa, provided that the 
exemption is authorised by an agreement entered into by the governments of the foreign 
state and South Africa (s10(1)(c)(v))’.46 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to Act No. 88 of 1965 introduces amendments to the then section 10 
of the principal Act which stipulates the following: 
‘Paragraph (a) introduces an exemption from tax in respect of certain foreign workers who are 
temporarily employed in the Republic, if such exemption is provided for in an international 
agreement.’ 
 
From the above it is clarified that the term ‘subject’ refers to ‘certain foreign workers’. This term can 
be applied to the Mozambican mineworkers who are temporarily employed in South Africa and not 
foreign workers in general. Since the 1964 labour agreement came into force on the 1st of January 
1965 it is submitted that the Act was amended to make provision for certain foreign workers such as 
the Mozambican mineworkers for the exemption from tax in South Africa. The term ‘agreement’ 
refers to an ‘international agreement’ which can be applied to the 1964 labour agreement between 
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South Africa and Mozambique which is a source of international law. The exemption from tax is 
certainly provided for in the 1964 labour agreement. 
 
4. The implications of and interaction of the 1964 labour agreement 
with the South Africa-Mozambique DTC distributive rules 
 
The 1964 labour agreement’s main objective will be determined in relation to the South Africa –
Mozambique DTC as reflected in its preamble or title on the ‘avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income’. This analysis is necessary to determine 
the nature of the income earned by the Mozambican workers, to allocate the right to tax the income 
either to the country of residence firstly and then to the country of source and to give relief for 
foreign taxes payable by the Mozambican workers in the elimination of double taxation. These 
factors are necessary to establish whether the 1964 labour agreement is in conflict with provisions 
as laid down in the South Africa – Mozambique DTC. 
 
4.1 Right to tax the remuneration either to the country of residence (Mozambique) or 
the country of source (South Africa) 
 
South African domestic law defines ‘gross income’, in the case of any resident, the total amount, in 
cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such resident, as or in the case of any 
person other than a resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in 
favour of such person from a source within or deemed to be within the Republic. 
 
South Africa had a source basis of taxation prior to the year 2001. Amounts were only subject to tax 
in South Africa if they were from a source within the Republic. The residence of the taxpayer was 
irrelevant. As from 1 January 2001 the source basis of taxation was replaced by residence basis for 
years of assessment commencing after that date.  
 
A resident is defined in section 1 of the Act as either a person who is ‘ordinarily resident’ in South 
Africa. In other words, South Africa is his or her true home or, in the case of a person not ordinarily 
resident, who has spent a certain number of days in South Africa, i.e. more than 91 days in total in 
each of the current and previous five tax years and more than 915 days in total during the previous 




For a non-resident, only receipts derived from sources within the Republic are subject to tax in South 
Africa. 
Section 9(2) of the Act contains deemed source rules in respect of various categories of income. As 
there is no specific deemed source rules for services rendered in South Africa by non-residents, the 
deemed source of services rendered can be linked to section 9(2)(i) of the Act that deals with 
pensions and annuities received or accrued in respect of services rendered within South Africa. 
Although this section refers to pensions partly received or accrued in South Africa for services 
rendered, it can be linked to the income received or accrued by the Mozambican mineworkers for 
services rendered in South Africa in respect of the 1964 labour agreement.   
 
The Mozambican mineworkers that entered into contracts for the first time will not be classified as 
tax residents as they do not meet the requirements of being physically present in South Africa as 
discussed above. The length of their agreement is for 12 months with an option to extend it to a 
further 6 months after which they have to return to Mozambique, should the terms of the labour 
agreement be strictly applied.   
 
The source of their income will be the services rendered which is located in South Africa. The income 
will be included in ‘gross income’ as defined in section 1 of the Act. 
 
In terms of the Mozambican domestic law a resident is subject to tax on worldwide income with 
unilateral relief available for any foreign tax paid. A non-resident is taxable only on Mozambique 
source income.47 
 
Juridical double taxation which is the imposition of comparable taxes by two tax jurisdictions namely 
South Africa and Mozambique may arise on the same taxpayer in respect of the same income. 
 
In respect of the Mozambican mineworker working in South Africa for 12 months with an option to 
extend it to a further 6 months there might be a source-residence conflict between the two States. 
The individual may be taxed in Mozambique on its worldwide income and South Africa may tax the 
same individual at source under its domestic law. 
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The OECD Commentary on Article 15(1) indicates that the general rule as to the taxation of income 
from employment (other than pensions) is that such income is taxable in the State where the 
employment is actually exercised. Employment is exercised in the place where the employee is 
physically present when performing the activities for which the employment income is paid.  
 
The OECD Commentary states further that the condition provided by the Article for taxation by the 
State of source is that the salaries, wages or other similar remuneration be derived from the exercise 
of employment in that State. This applies regardless of when that income may be paid to, credited to 
or otherwise definitely acquired by the employee. 
 
The exception in paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the DTC between South Africa and Mozambique will 
not apply to the Mozambican mineworkers as they exceed the 183 day rule and their remuneration 
is paid by an employer (i.e. South African mines) which is a resident in South Africa. The general rule 
in paragraph 1 will therefore apply as of day one. The Mozambican mineworkers should therefore be 
taxed in South Africa on a source basis and their income will be included in ‘gross income’ as defined 
in section 1 of the Act and in terms of the DTC. 
 
On the other hand instances may exist where Mozambican mineworkers regularly renew their 
contracts and claim relief under the 1964 labour agreement due to the poor drafting of the 
agreement.  In these instances such workers may be regarded as being resident in South Africa 
through application of the physical presence test.  The Mozambican mineworkers’ regularly 
renewing contracts are likely be present in South Africa for more than 91 days in total in each of the 
current and previous five tax years and more than 915 days in total during the previous five tax 
years. The Mozambican mineworkers would not be ‘ordinarily resident’ in South Africa as they 
would in all likelihood return to Mozambique if they decide not to renew their contracts. The 
Mozambican mineworkers will therefore be considered as residents for tax purposes in South Africa.  
 
For tax purposes an individual is resident in Mozambique if he/she resides in the country for more 
than 180 days in a tax year or has a permanent residence in Mozambique at 31 December.48 
 
As can be seen from the domestic laws of both South Africa and Mozambique, the Mozambican 
mineworker may be a tax resident in both States.  
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In terms Article 4 of the DTC between South Africa and Mozambique the definition of resident 
should firstly be determined in accordance with the domestic laws of both countries. Where dual 
residence occurs, the tie –breaker clause is applied. Under the tie- breaker clause certain tests are 
applied to determine in which country the dual resident is regarded as a resident for the purposes of 
the DTC between South Africa and Mozambique. 
 
The first test to apply for residence is whether the Mozambican mineworker has a permanent home 
in either South Africa or Mozambique and in which country the Mozambican mineworker’s personal 
and economic relations are closer, which is referred as the ‘centre of vital interests’. As the 
Mozambican mineworker’s stay in South Africa is not of a short term nature as they will be regularly 
renewing their contracts, it is submitted that the mineworkers will have a permanent home in South 
Africa. In Mozambique, the mineworkers’ family will be resident in that country which will indicate 
that the mineworkers in most cases will have a permanent home when they return from South 
Africa. The Mozambican mineworkers therefore have a permanent home in both countries. 
 
In the so-called Pavarotti Italian court case an indication was given of what is meant by the term 
‘centre of vital interests’. The Tax Court decided that the real estate interest located in and outside 
of Italy and the current accounts and securities deposited in Italian banks was indicative of the 
taxpayer’s main centre of economic interest.49 As will be discussed later in more detail the 
Mozambican mineworkers are compelled in terms of their contract to defer 60% of their earnings in 
South Africa to a central bank in Mozambique. This may provide an indication that Mozambique is 
their ‘centre of vital interest’. The money will mainly be used in Mozambique after their return from 
South Africa. The Mozambican mineworker’s main centre of economic interest will be in 
Mozambique as stated in the above Italian course case. 
 
If the above was considered decisive, the Mozambican mineworkers would be resident for tax 
purposes in Mozambique. However, the ‘centre of vital interests’ determination is clouded by the 
establishment of the Mozambican mineworkers’ personal interests. In decisions of the Swiss Federal 
Court50 the individual’s family ties took precedence over other economic ties.51 Following such a 
view, the Mozambican mineworkers’ family ties would be in Mozambique. However, it is submitted 
that should uncertainty remain after this test, the remaining tie-breaker rules would be consulted.  
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The second test of the tie – breaker clause refers to habitual abode. It is submitted that in this 
instance, there is little difference from the test of a ‘permanent home’.  The contract duration may 
require what could be termed a habitual abode. It is submitted that the Mozambican mineworkers 
may have a habitual abode in South Africa and therefore closer ties to South Africa. Whenever they 
decide to return back to Mozambique their habitual abode will be in Mozambique and they would 
then have closer ties to that State. However, the Mozambican mineworkers may have a habitual 
abode in both States. 
 
The third test will give a clear indication as to which country the Mozambican mineworkers will be 
resident for tax purposes. This test will refer to the nationality of the mineworkers to either South 
Africa or Mozambique. The 1964 labour agreement refers to Portuguese workers from Mozambique. 
Therefore, it refers to nationality.  As nationality refers to citizenship of a particular country, the 
Mozambican mineworkers will be a national of Mozambique for the duration of their contracts in 
South Africa.  
 
This nationality basis would appear conclusive to determine residency under the DTC in the absence 
of a result in the earlier tests.  This determined residence would therefore also apply for the tax 
purposes of the Mozambican mineworkers in establishing the effects of the terms of the 1964 labour 
agreement.  
 
It is submitted that most tests would appear to indicate that Mozambican mineworkers that 




4.2 Is the treaty even relevant to the earnings contemplated- Is there any revenue loss 
to South Africa 
 
‘Deferment of wages is compulsory for Mozambique mineworkers, having been negotiated between 
the government of South Africa and the government of Mozambique (then the Government of 
Portugal). All Mozambique mineworkers, irrespective of which recruiting organisation was involved 
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in their recruitment are subjected to the rules as contained in the agreements between the 
respective governments.’52 
 
TEBA Ltd, as the largest approved agent for the collection of compulsory deferred pay for 
mineworkers recruited from Lesotho and Mozambique, was required in terms of the Deferred Pay 
Act (Act No.18 of 1974) and the Mozambique inter government agreement to receive deferred pay 
monies monthly from member mines/contractors and to pay over these monies to the respective 
governments. In terms of the Lesotho Deferred Pay Act (Act No.18 of 1974), Lesotho mineworkers 
based in South Africa defer 30% of their gross earnings to Lesotho via Teba Bank (now rebranded as 
Ubank) for 10 months per 12 month contract.53  
 
‘Mozambique mineworkers are compelled to defer 60% of net earnings, via TEBA Ltd, to the central 
bank of Mozambique for 6 months of their 12 month contract, or 12 of their 18 month contract. 
Mozambique mineworkers cannot access their deferred wages until the end of their contracts whilst 
Lesotho mineworkers can access deferred wages monthly. TEBA Ltd provides this service to its 
shareholders and clients in return for an administrative fee of 1.5%, based on the collections. The 
amount collected from mineworkers in 2005 was approximately R660 000 000.’54 
 
In respect of the Mozambican mineworkers the Central Bank of Mozambique estimates that total 
mineworkers’ remittances amounted to US$72.1m in 2010 (R526,5m).55 
 
No figures are available on the possible loss of revenue to the South African fiscus caused by the 
exemption in terms of the 1964 labour agreement. However, it is evident that the amounts 
considered are not inconsequential and it appears that a revenue loss of some form does occur as a 
result of the application of this agreement.   
 
Two important factors will be examined in relation to the possible revenue loss. The first is how the 
South African mines are treating these mineworkers for tax purposes on their South African source 
income. Secondly, how SARS is treating these mineworkers for tax purposes and whether SARS is 
interpreting the 1964 labour agreement correctly to the different types of Mozambican 
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mineworkers that make use of this agreement for the exemption of taxes on their South African 
source income. These factors are important as they will give an indication of whether any revenue 
loss to South Africa occurs. 
 
It is submitted that Mozambican mineworkers that regularly renew their contracts are likely to be 
skilled mineworkers and in some cases be specialised in their fields.  In such cases most workers 
would be earning a salary which is above the annual tax threshold. Those that enter into contracts 
for the first time would in most cases be earning a salary that is below the annual tax threshold.  In 
the cases where the salary is below the tax threshold, there is no revenue loss as there is no amount 
on which tax would ordinarily be collected.   
 
If it is assumed that the South African mines employing workers from Mozambique are applying the 
exemption in terms of the 1964 agreement read with the Income Tax Act and that such exemption is 
being applied to those regularly returning workers earning salaries above the threshold, a potential 
revenue loss clearly exists as the exemption is taking place at source and the taxing rights in terms of 
the DTC cannot then be exercised by South Africa.   
 
If the exemption is being incorrectly applied and the 1964 agreement only applies to the first 
contract, it is submitted that the subsequent years of assessment may have resulted in tax in South 
Africa on this South African source income. In such a case, the revenue loss to SARS may have been 
substantial. SARS in such instances may return to previous assessments and issue revised 
assessments for these mineworkers in terms of section 99 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. 
For section 99 to apply SARS should consider whether the full amount of tax chargeable was not 
assessed due to fraud, misrepresentation or non- disclosure of material facts. It is submitted that the 
exemption of taxes provision in the 1964 labour agreement was applied incorrectly by the 
Mozambican mineworkers. It is a practice generally prevailing by the Mozambican mineworkers that 
when entering into contracts in terms of the 1964 labour agreement, the income earned in South 
Africa will be exempt from any taxes. It is further submitted that there was no misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure of material facts. This is based on the opinion of the Mozambican mineworkers that 
the content of the statement they had made in their previous tax returns was in respect of the 
exemption of taxes provision in the 1964 labour agreement. It is further submitted that there was no 
direct link between the misrepresentation or non- disclosure of material facts and the Mozambican 
mineworkers paying too little tax in the previous years of assessment. SARS can therefore only go 




Should the exemption have been incorrectly applied by the mines, the first instance of recovery by 
SARS would be the recovery of the PAYE that should have been deducted in the previous years from 
the South African mines in terms of paragraph 5 of the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
 
If the contracts of the Mozambican mineworkers are not renewable beyond the 18 months in terms 
of the 1964 labour agreement, in other words there is no renewal of contracts, then the issues are 
minimised as the DTC rules between South Africa and Mozambique would then apply and the 
domestic exemption would not. This would leave South Africa able to tax on a source basis with no 
loss to the fiscus. As I previously indicated the renewals of contracts are possible in the South African 
mines and this remains a key flaw of the 1964 labour agreement. 
 
It is submitted that SARS should request to clarify the application of the exemption by protocol to 
the 1964 labour agreement as negotiated by Government, specifically as regards the Mozambican 
mineworkers that regularly renew their employment contracts.  
 
The prevention of the revenue loss and effective base erosion caused by this agreement and its 
application should be addressed.  Such correction would also be in line with the anti-BEPS proposals 
from the OECD in relation to treaty abuse.  Whether the 1964 agreement is justifiable in the current 
BEPS environment needs to be addressed by Government.   
 
4.3 Article 22 of the DTC between South Africa and Mozambique on the elimination of 
double taxation  
 
Article XXVI of the 1964 labour agreement between South Africa and Portugal stipulates the 
following: 
‘Portuguese workers whose employment in the Republic of South Africa is regulated by the provisions 
of this Agreement shall not be liable for any direct taxes payable in South Africa. The Province of 
Mozambique shall not collect any levies or taxes from the workers for the signing of contracts, 
medical examinations, departures from or entry into the Province of Mozambique’ 56 
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From the above it can be concluded that the Mozambican mineworkers are not subject to South 
African taxes, but it appears that there is no objection to the levying of Mozambican tax.57  The 
agreement seems more far reaching, applying to all direct taxes in South Africa (i.e. income tax, 
employee’s tax etc.). 
 
In the event that double taxation may arise then paragraph 1(a)(i) of Article 22 of the DTC should be 
applied. This article states the following: 
‘In Mozambique, where a resident of Mozambique derives income which, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention may be taxed in South Africa, Mozambique shall allow as a 
deduction from the tax on income of that resident an amount equal to the South African tax 
paid. Such deduction shall not, however, exceed that part of the tax on income, as computed 
before the deduction is given, which is attributable to the income which may be taxed in 
South Africa.’58 
 
The above paragraph follows the so – called ‘ordinary credit method’ where Mozambique as the 
State of residence allows as a deduction from its own tax an amount equal to the tax paid in South 
Africa in respect of the Mozambican mineworkers.59 
 
The above paragraph further stipulates that South Africa may, but not necessarily tax the income of 
the Mozambican mineworkers. In the event that South Africa chooses not too, would leave the 
taxation open to Mozambique. 
 
According to paragraph 2 of the same article it states the following: 
‘For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, the terms “Mozambican tax paid” and 
“South African tax paid” shall be deemed to include the amount of tax which would have 
been paid in Mozambique or South Africa, as the case may be, but for an exemption or 
reduction granted in accordance with laws which establish schemes for the promotion of 
economic development in Mozambique or South Africa, as the case may be, such schemes 
having been mutually agreed by the competent authorities of the Contracting States as 
qualifying for the purposes of this paragraph’ 60 
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The above paragraph contains a reciprocal tax sparing clause. This means that tax residents from 
either South Africa or Mozambique could benefit from the provision in each case, should each 
country have reductions or exemptions for foreign investors. The DTC with Mozambique specifically 
provides that the schemes to promote economic development must be mutually agreed by the 
competent authorities of the Contracting States as qualifying for the purposes of this paragraph. No 
list of such agreed schemes have been made public, that is not to say that such schemes do not 
exist, merely that their existence is not in the public domain.61 
 
‘The bilateral treaties licensed the mining industry to pursue its own private recruiting in 
neighbouring countries. The mines (through TEBA) had complete control over who they would 
recruit and where. On the supplier side, the treaties contained provisions to ensure that some of the 
benefits of migration flowed back home and to make it impossible for migrants to ever become 
permanent residents of South Africa. In that respect, they were prototypical bilateral agreements.’62 
 
‘The advantages of the migrant labour system of recruitment were that it benefited both the South 
African economy and colonial state of Mozambique. It assured an organised and cheaper source of 
labour for South African mines and contributed to the stability and profitability of this sector. In 
terms of benefits for the colonial State of Mozambique, this system brought vitally important 
revenue from recruiting, licence and passport fees.’63 
 
‘It also allowed for the higher taxes levied on Mozambicans in southern Mozambique. There was in 
addition revenue from customs dues from goods that these workers brought home from South 
Africa; income from railways freights and transit duties on commodities passing through Lourenço 
Marques from and to the Transvaal. Additionally deferred payment, established in 1928, benefited 
the colonial economy twofold. Firstly, the state received the deferred payment of migrant workers in 
pounds or in gold but it paid the migrant workers in local currency (Escudos), which allowed the 
State to accumulate foreign currency. Secondly, the fact that the migrant workers were paid in local 
                                                             
61  Oliver, L., and Honiball, M. 2011. International Tax: A South African Perspective. Cape Town: Siber Ink: 466 -
470 
 
62 Maja, B. & Nakanyana, S. 2007. Labour migration and South Africa: Towards a fairer deal for migrants in the 
South African economy. [Online]. Available: http://www.labour.gov.za 
63 Gasper, N. 2006. The reduction of Mozambican workers in South African Mines, 1975 – 1992: A case study of 
the consequences for Gaza Province – District of Chibuto. [Online]. Available. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10539/4839 [16 May 2008]: 16 -34 
26 
 
currency  in Mozambique led to the growth of the local market which was dominated by Portuguese 
commodities, or at least goods sold by Portuguese traders, such as wine, clothes, shoes and so on.’64 
 
‘The opportunities of employment in southern Mozambique were clearly limited and dependent on 
plantations and public services where the wages were low and the work conditions were poor; thus, 
workers and their families benefited significantly from the system of migrant labour because it 
allowed them to obtain higher income in the mines.’65 
 
It is submitted that the 1964 labour agreement may be seen as a scheme for the promotion of 
economic development for both South Africa and Mozambique and the tax sparing clause in 
paragraph 2 of Article 22 in such a case may therefore be applied to both States.  
 
In the event that South Africa does not levy the tax through the exemption being applied then, as 
stipulated in paragraph 2 of the above article, the tax that would have been levied may still reduce 
the Mozambican tax leading to double non- taxation. This can be illustrated as follows: 
Assume that South Africa has a tax rate of 30% and Mozambique has a tax rate of 40%. The 
Mozambican mineworker earns income of R1 000 in South Africa. The Mozambican 
mineworker’s tax position in each country is as follows: 
South Africa 
Income sourced in South Africa       1 000 
Tax payable in South Africa         R0 
Mozambique 
Worldwide income        1 000 
Tax on worldwide income (40% x R1 000)       400 
Less: foreign tax credit (tax otherwise payable in  
South African tax that would otherwise have been levied)    (300)  
Tax payable in Mozambique         100 
 
Due to the tax sparing provision in the DTC between the two countries, the Mozambican 
mineworker will only pay 100 in income tax in Mozambique. This will lead to double non- taxation of 
300 in both South Africa and Mozambique.  
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‘The OECD Committee of Fiscal Affairs concluded that tax sparing provisions should only be 
considered with regards to countries where the economic level is considerably below to that of 
OECD Member States. They also state that adopting these provisions will minimize the potential for 
abuse of such provisions in respect of lost revenue to both the country of residence and the country 
of source. This will ensure that the provisions apply exclusively to genuine investments aimed at 
developing the source State.’66 
 
This is particularly true in the case of South Africa as the organised and cheap source of labour to 
South African mines contributed to the stability and profitability of this sector in South Africa. 
  
4.4   Conclusion 
 
The definition of ‘gross income’ as defined in section 1 of the Act includes remuneration earned by 
non-residents from a source or deemed source within the Republic. The source of the income of the 
Mozambican mineworkers will be the services rendered which is located in South Africa by applying 
the deemed source rules in terms of section 9(2) of the Act.  
 
South Africa therefore has the right to tax the income earned by the Mozambican mineworkers 
according to its domestic law. In addition, Article 14 of the DTC between South Africa and 
Mozambique gives South Africa the right to tax the income earned by the Mozambican 
mineworkers. 
 
If the 1964 labour agreement is strictly applied the Mozambican mineworkers that entered into 
contracts for the first time would not be taxed in South Africa and there would be a revenue loss to 
South Africa if their earnings are above the annual tax threshold. 
 
There may be a substantial revenue loss to South Africa in respect of the Mozambican mineworkers 
that regularly renew their contracts in terms of the 1964 labour agreement as their earnings in most 
cases would be above the annual tax threshold. 
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Paragraph 2 of article 22 of the DTC provides a tax sparing provision if it is established that a scheme 
for the promotion of economic development exists between the two countries. The 1964 labour 
agreement between the two countries as discussed above appears to be such an arrangement.  
 
5.  Does the 1964 labour agreement conflict with other legislation? 
 
The 1964 Labour Agreement will be analysed to determine whether it is in conflict with the 
Immigration Act No. 13 of 2000 instituted by South Africa including the Constitution of South Africa, 
1996. This is necessary to establish whether this agreement will invoke any discrimination clauses. 
 
The Immigration Act (No 13 of 2002) deals with immigration and migration. It repeals the Aliens 
Control Act of 1991 as well as the Aliens Control Amendment Act (No. 76 of 1995) and regulates the 
admission of people to South Africa and their right to live and work here. The Act uses a licensing fee 
to manage the process of allowing foreigners to work and live in South Africa. It also regulates the 
movement of migrant workers in certain sectors such as mine working and agricultural work.67  
 
The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 was approved by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 
1996 and took effect on 4 February 1997. The Constitution was as a result of some detailed 
negotiations on the part of government with an awareness of the injustices of the past. It is widely 
considered to be the most progressive constitution in the world, with a Bill of Rights second to 
none.68  
 
5.1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
It should first be established whether constitutional law applies to all persons in South Africa, 
irrespective of whether they are citizens or aliens. 69 
 
The present Constitution does not contain any direct reference to application to all persons in South 
Africa irrespective if they are citizens of another country. Therefore, these provisions should be 
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determined on the principles of international law. It is submitted that Mozambican mineworkers 
working in South Africa are afforded the same Constitutional rights as citizens while in South Africa.70 
 
Attention has previously been drawn to the potentially unconstitutional aspects of the 1964 labour 
agreement, such as compulsory deferred pay. The agreement raises the question of discrimination 
as envisaged in section 9 of the Bill of Rights which contains the provisions of equality. The following 
aspects in the 1964 labour agreement may be seen as discrimination in relation to the Mozambican 
mineworkers, South Africans (mineworkers and normal citizens), mineworkers of neighbouring 
States like Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana which entered into similar agreements and workers 
who obtained work permits under the Aliens Control Act (now repealed): 
 
a) Compulsory deferred pay and remittances 
In respect of the Mozambican mineworkers the aspect of compulsory deferred pay and remittances 
on remuneration received in South Africa should be analysed. This requirement is stated in Article 
XVIII of the 1964 labour agreement. ‘There is considerable debate about the deferred pay system. 
On the South African side, neither the Chamber of Mines71 nor the NUM appear to be in favour of 
this system. Others argue that the system violates the basic rights of a person as contained in the 
Constitution to earn and spend their money where they wish.’72 
 
b) Permanent residence 
Workers from the Southern African region seeking legal access to South Africa were subject to a dual 
system of control known as the ‘two gates’ policy. The two gates were (a) the Aliens Control Act of 
1991 (now repealed) and (b) various bilateral labour agreements between South Africa and the 
neighbouring States of Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. Under the new 
Immigration Act, 2002, the mineworkers working under bilateral treaties would not be affected 
when applying their trade in South Africa. The Labour Market Commission, which is a commission to 
investigate the Development of a Comprehensive Labour Market Policy, argues that the ‘two gates’ 
policy, still in application to persons prior to the repeal of the Aliens Control Act, is discriminatory. It 
discriminates against those Mozambican mineworkers who remain perpetual contract workers 
under the 1964 labour agreement and are denied the right to more permanent residence and 
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employment, as envisaged by South African immigration legislation.73 Furthermore, these 
mineworkers cannot bring their families with them under the 1964 labour agreement. 
 
c) Compensation and unemployment insurance 
‘The bilateral treaties do not provide adequately for compensation and unemployment insurance, 
and the provisions that do exist are out of date. In relation to compensation, migrant workers are 
generally covered by South African legislation, namely by the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act No. 130 of 1993 (COIDA) and the Occupational Diseases in Mines and 
Works Act No. 208 of 1993. Compensation in terms of COIDA is often made through TEBA (now an 
independent company with labour processing, financial and modest development functions) except 
in relation to Mozambique where it is paid to the Mozambican labour delegate. There is a great deal 
of dissatisfaction among Mozambican miners relating to the system of compensation. They claim 
that they either do not receive the money due to them or that they receive only part of it.’74 
 
d) Employment contracts 
‘Employee contracts governed by the treaties are also outmoded and contrary to international 
requirements insofar as they do not contain details of the occupation the miner will be engaged in 
nor the remuneration he will receive. Newly recruited workers only receive these details when they 
arrive at the mine.’75 
 
It might be possible that the employment contracts might infringe on the rights of the Mozambican 
mineworker to fair labour practices as envisaged in section 23 of the Bill of Rights. The Mozambican 
mineworker may not have certain labour rights in respect of the right to collective bargaining and to 
join a trade union.  
 
e) Policy of job preference 
‘The policy of job preference for nationals is also reflected in the bilateral treaties. ‘The Lesotho, 
Botswana and Swaziland treaties provide that recruitment of labour is subject to the availability of 
South African labour.76  While there is no such provision in the Mozambique agreement, it 
nevertheless provides that the number of workers to be recruited will be mutually agreed upon by 
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the two governments, thus in fact allowing for the operation of a regulated quota system.’77 The 
South African mineworkers may be discriminated against due to the fact job preference would first 
be given to Mozambican mineworkers. 
 
f) Exemption from direct taxes 
Exemption from direct taxes in South Africa which is applicable to Mozambican mineworkers for a 
maximum period of 18 months as stated in the provision of Article XXVI of the 1964 labour 
agreement.78 The South African mineworkers and indeed all citizens of South Africa are 
discriminated against by virtue of the exemption from Income Tax applicable to Mozambican 
mineworkers. 
 
5.2 The Immigration Act No.13, 2002 
 
‘In the past the South African immigration policy has been described as having ‘two gates’ which is a 
dual system of control for foreign workers. Under the Aliens Control Act, immigration and temporary 
residence is governed by statute. However, exemption clauses in the Act allow for bilateral treaties 
with neighbouring states which govern the entry of contract workers, primarily in the mining and 
commercial agriculture sectors.’79 
 
In respect of the South African Immigration Act it was therefore proposed to continue the system of 
exemptions. In effect this would mean that the 1964 labour agreement in respect of the 
Mozambican mineworkers continues and the contract labour system remains outside legislative 
control in this instance.80 
 
6. Is the 1964 labour agreement a harmful tax practice as 
contemplated in the SADC treaty 
 
The 1964 labour agreement will be analysed to determine whether the exemption of taxes on 
income received by the Mozambican mineworkers in South Africa can be seen as harmful 
transactions as contemplated in the SADC treaty. This is necessary to establish whether the 
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agreement is in contravention of any of the permissible types of tax incentives provided in the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Co-Operation in Taxation and Related Matters (MoU) issued by 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
 
 6.1 Is the 1964 labour agreement a tax incentive? 
  
‘Many countries, developed and developing alike, offer various incentives in the hope of attracting 
investors and fostering economic growth. Yet there is strong evidence81 that calls into question the 
effectiveness of some tax incentives for investment, including in particular tax free zones and tax 
holidays. Indeed, ineffective tax incentives are no compensation for or alternative to a poor 
investment climate and may actually damage a developing country’s revenue base, eroding 
resources for the real drivers of investment decisions - infrastructure, education and security.’ 82 
 
‘Tax base erosion due to tax incentives is compounded by the lack of transparency and clarity in the 
provision, administration, and governance of tax incentives. The granting of tax incentives for 
investment is often done outside of a country’s tax laws and administration, sometimes under 
multiple pieces of legislation. The design and administration of tax incentives may be the 
responsibility of several different Ministries (e.g., finance, trade, investment). Where various 
Ministries are involved, they may not coordinate their incentive measures (tax and non-tax) with 
each other or the national revenue authority, with the result that incentives may overlap, be 
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2008).  
82 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"). 2003. Draft Principles to Enhance the 




inconsistent, or even work at cross-purposes. Administrative discretion in the management of 
incentives can seriously increase the risk of corruption and rent seeking.’83 
 
6.2 Definition of tax incentives 
 
‘The Business Dictionary (2011) defines a tax incentive as ‘the deduction, exclusion, or exemption 
from a tax liability offered as an enticement to engage in a specified activity (such as investment in 
capital goods for a certain period’. The MoU issued by the SADC defines tax incentives as ‘fiscal 
measures that are used to attract local or foreign investment capital to certain economic activities or 
particular areas in a country.’ 
 
The above can also apply to individuals. Tax sparing can also be linked to the granting of tax 
incentives to foreign investors, particularly in regard to the promotion of economic development in 
the source State.84 Tax sparing can also apply to foreign individuals in the source State. 
 
‘The fundamental purpose of taxation is to raise revenue effectively, through measures that suit 
each country’s circumstances and administrative capacity. In fulfilling the revenue function, a well-
designed tax system should be efficient in minimizing the distortionary impact on resource 
allocation, and equitable in its impact on different groups in society.’85 
 
According to the SADC Memorandum of Understanding on Taxation (2002), tax incentives are ‘fiscal 
measures that are used to attract local or foreign investment capital to certain economic activities or 
particular areas in a country.’ This definition excludes ‘general tax incentives’ that apply to all 
investments.86 
 
Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002) adopt a similar definition in a recent review of this topic. They claim that 
‘any tax provision that is applicable to all investment projects does not constitute a tax incentive.’ 
This definition excludes ‘general tax incentives’, such as accelerated depreciation that applies to all 
investments. 87 
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6.3 Memorandum of understanding on the co-operation in taxation and related 
matters - SADC 
 
In 2002 the Southern African Development Community (SADC) issued the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Co-Operation in Taxation and Related Matters (MoU) to its fifteen member states. 
In terms of the MoU the member States agreed on steps to be taken to co-operate in taxation 
matters and to harmonise the tax regimes of the member States in accordance with Articles 21 and 
22 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (Treaty). 
 
Article 4(1) of the MoU stipulates that member States will endeavour to achieve a common 
approach to the treatment and application of tax incentives and will, amongst other things, ensure 
that tax incentives are provided for only in tax legislation. 
 
Article 4 of the MoU provides the following tax incentives: 
a) investment allowances in addition to full depreciation allowances; 
b) an investment tax credit where a certain percentage of the acquisition cost is deducted in 
addition to normal depreciation deductions, from the tax liability; 
c) the full cost of acquisition of the asset is allowed as a deduction from the taxable profits of 
the year in which the investment was made; 
d) accelerated depreciation allowances; 
e) declining balance depreciation allowances; 
f) tax privileged export processing or enterprise zones; and 
g) tax holidays. 
 
The above incentives can be seen as focussing more on investment tax incentives operating through 
company income tax although some can also apply to individuals.  
 
6.4 Tax incentive – Exemption from normal tax for Mozambican mineworkers 
 
The 1964 Labour agreement can be seen as focussing more on individual tax incentives than on 
corporate tax incentives. There are no incentives in the hope of attracting investors and fostering 
economic growth as in the case of corporate tax incentives. The Mozambican mineworkers are 
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provided tax incentives in the form of exemptions from income tax on remuneration for a maximum 
of 18 months of their contract. 
 
There is a form of tax base erosion due to the tax incentives provided to the Mozambican 
mineworkers as there could be a lack of transparency and clarity in the provision, administration and 
governance of the tax incentive provided to the mineworkers. Although the 1964 labour agreement 
is given effect in terms of s 10(1)(c)(v) of the Act which exempts the mineworkers from normal tax 
on income there is clearly a lack of transparency and clarity due to the tax incentive. The 1964 labour 
agreement is not well known to SARS and other government departments and the South African 
public in general. 
 
The agreement is not always readily assessable to SARS and other government departments e.g. the 
labour department that have to keep statistical data with regards to immigration and working 
permits. There are no up to date figures available on the revenue loss to the fiscus as a result of the 
income not taxed. Revenue losses in total remittances which includes compulsory and voluntary 
deferment of wages is not readily available. Therefore, the tax incentives provided to the 
Mozambican mineworkers are not always collected and reported which will certainly have an effect 
on reliability of adequate analysis that can be provided to government on the analysis of their costs 
and benefits in a national context to support government decision –making.  
 
6.5 Restricting tax incentives to particular taxpayers – Mozambican mineworkers 
 
South Africa imposes tax on a residence basis and tax non-residents on a source basis. Therefore the 
exemption on any tax payable on income received by the Mozambican workers in South Africa is 
clearly a tax incentive. This is often a clear indication that South Africa is engaged in harmful tax 
competition as stipulated in Article 4(3)(a) of the MoU. The Article lists a number of instances which 
are evidence of harmful tax competition. This includes “ring fencing” of a regime from the domestic 
economy in favour of non-resident taxpayers which is applicable in the case of the Mozambican 
mineworkers. The Mozambican mineworkers that are incorporated into this regime enjoy the 
benefit of the infrastructure of South Africa which provides the preferential tax regime, without 
necessarily incurring the cost of the infrastructure.88 
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‘The fundamental purpose of taxation is to mobilize revenue to finance the provision of public goods 
and services through the government budget. Therefore, the core principle of taxation is that the tax 
system should be an effective instrument for raising revenue. While fulfilling the revenue function, 
taxes also have a pervasive influence on economic decisions of individuals and businesses, and on 
social equity. Hence, the tax system should be structured to achieve the appropriate level of revenue 
as efficiently and fairly as possible. In short, a well-designed tax system should be: 89 
• Effective in raising revenue;  
• Efficient in its effect on resource allocation decisions of households and businesses; and 
• Equitable in its impact on different groups in society’.   
‘An effective tax system is one that satisfies revenue requirements, given the desired scope and size 
of government and the availability of non-tax financing. In dynamic terms, an effective tax system 
should be elastic, in the sense that revenue rises naturally with GDP without requiring frequent ad 
hoc measures. An effective tax system must be consistent with a country’s administrative capacity. 
Even the best tax code can produce poor results if it is not well administered. The introduction of 
special investment incentives inherently complicates tax administration and creates loopholes 
through which companies and wealthy taxpayers avoid or evade other tax obligations. These are 
serious problems worldwide, but the costs are especially high in countries with weak tax 
administration and critical revenue constraints. Under these conditions, simplicity is a cardinal 
principal.’90 
 
‘Many SADC countries face a critical need to enhance tax collections (relative to GDP) in order to 
finance urgent demands for public services, including those essential to economic growth and social 
welfare, such as education, health, public security, legal and judicial systems, and economic 
infrastructure. Therefore, the revenue effect of tax incentives is a central concern. In countries with 
adequate fiscal resources, revenue risks may not be a major issue; but in countries where revenue 
performance is precarious, such policies may be highly imprudent.’91 
 
SARS might assess the Mozambican mineworkers according to the DTC between South Africa and 
Mozambique. This may result in objections from the Mozambican mineworkers who insist that they 
should not be taxed in South Africa according to the 1964 labour agreement. The above problem can 
be due to an administrative capacity in the organisation, in that revenue authority staff might be 
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unaware of the 1964 agreement and how it should be implemented. It can also be said that the 
agreement will have an impact on revenue loss which in turn will affect urgent demands for the 
finance of public services in both a South African and a Mozambican context. 
 
‘Efficiency is especially important for poor countries that can least afford economic losses due to 
avoidable resource misallocation. To minimize efficiency losses, most tax reform programs in 
developing countries aim to apply a moderate tax rate to a broad tax base. To the extent that special 
incentives shrink the tax base, revenue targets can only be achieved with higher tax rates on other 
activities or persons that remain chargeable.’92 
 
The 1964 agreement stipulates that the mineworkers would not be liable for any direct taxes 
payable in South Africa on income received. This will have an effect that tax rates would increase on 
other activities and residents of South Africa. 
 
‘The concept of tax equity is endlessly debated. Yet there is widespread agreement that an equitable 
tax system should:93  
• Minimize the tax burden on the poor;  
•  Collect more from the rich than from those with lower incomes (vertical equity); 
•  Avoid excessive tax rates and arbitrary impositions all around; and  
• Provide relatively uniform and non-discriminatory treatment of taxpayers with similar 
economic circumstances in terms of ability to pay (horizontal equity)’. 
 
‘Equity issues are often neglected in deliberations about tax incentives, but they surely bear 
consideration as a matter of principle, and also because perceptions of unfairness can undermine 
the political sustainability of an incentive program. Investment incentives directly reduce the tax 
burden on income earned by relatively wealthy investors. As a result other taxpayers may bear a 
greater tax burden.’94 
 
The tax incentive to Mozambique workers is discriminatory towards South African mineworkers with 
similar economic circumstances and South African residents which are not employed in the mining 
sector. It can be said that the tax incentive is discriminatory towards the mine workers from 
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Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland with similar economic circumstances. The workers from these 
countries shall be liable to pay taxes levied upon them by their respective Governments. ‘The South 
African authorities shall endeavour to ensure that the employers of such workers deduct such taxes 
at the rates prescribed by the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland authorities from the wages of their 
employees and remit any monies so deducted to appropriate authorities of these countries 
according to the labour agreements with these countries.’95  
 
6.6 Regional integration of Mozambique in the SADC 
 
‘The mining industry in South Africa can be seen as the most important factor in the process of 
regional integration. From its inception, in the last third of the nineteenth century, this sector has 
needed large numbers of workers many of whom were recruited from different parts of Southern 
Africa. Mozambican workers were part of this process from the beginning and constituted a major 
segment within the migrant work force.’96 
 
‘This massive presence of Mozambican workers in the South African mining industry was important 
to the Mozambican economy. There were agreements concerning the supply of Mozambican 
workers to South African mines between the two States from the late nineteenth century. The 
system of deferred pay and the complementary accords about ports and railways conferred 
substantial advantages on the Mozambican State and economy. On the other hand, wage labour on 
the South African mines constituted a significant source of income for Mozambicans, especially in 
the rural areas of Southern Mozambique.’97 
 
6.7 Options for co-operation 
 
As stated in the MoU, the Member States are determined to take such steps as are necessary to 
maximise the co-operation of the Member States in taxation matters.  
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‘A well designed agreement on tax co-operation can be a win-win strategy for all Member States.’ 
Such an agreement will have a particular importance for the poorest Member States like 
Mozambique, which most need to attract additional investment. ‘Since the entire SADC community 
has an interest in helping the poorest members to develop, there is a widespread acceptance that a 
viable agreement should include special consideration for these States, allowing them more latitude 
in structuring their incentive programs.’98 
 
This would come back to the tax sparing provisions as discussed previously. Such an agreement 
between the Member States will contain tax sparing provisions for schemes for the promotion of 
economic development for the poorest members like Mozambique. 
 
This agreement read together with any DTA’s between the Member States and Mozambique may 
also contain such tax sparing provisions. As the workers from these Member States apply their trade 
in Mozambique in respect of genuine investments in developing Mozambique in line with their 
incentives programs this will lead to the non-taxation of their income in Mozambique as the source 
State.  If such agreement can be seen as a reciprocal tax sparing provision for any of the Member 
States in respect of the same incentive programs the same workers will also not be taxed in these 
States. This will lead to double non-taxation of the same income of these workers between the 




The 1964 bilateral labour agreement between South Africa and Mozambique appears to be in 
default of Article 21 and 22 of the SADC treaty which seeks co-operation of Member States in 
taxation matters and to harmonise the tax regimes. As stated previously mineworkers from 
Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho are treated differently on taxes levied upon them compared to 
Mozambican workers in similar circumstances.  Although it can be argued that the mineworkers 
from these States appear to be exempt from any taxes on income received in South Africa. 
According to the labour agreements of these States the Government of South Africa has the 
obligation to deduct taxes from these mineworkers and remit it to Governments of their respective 
States. 
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In case of the Mozambican labour agreement no such provision exists and it only states that the 
Mozambican mineworkers will be exempt from any taxes in South Africa. There is no uniform 
agreement on matters of tax incentives to particular taxpayers in the SADC Member States which in 
this instance are in respect to the tax incentives provided to the Mozambican mineworkers which in 
terms of Article 4(3)(a) of the MoU is evidence of harmful tax competition. 
 
On the other hand cognisance should be taken of the fact that the main objective of the SADC treaty 
is to seek regional integration of Member States in Southern Africa especially the poorest members 
like Mozambique.  
 
In some way the 1964 labour agreement between South Africa and Portugal goes a long way in 
achieving that objective. In not taxing the income of the Mozambique workers in South Africa, it 
would help attract investment in Mozambique which will have a significant impact on the 
Mozambican economy and society as a whole.   
 
7. Does the 1964 labour agreement violate the non- discrimination 
article of the South Africa – Mozambique DTC based on nationality?  
 
An analysis of the 1964 labour agreement will be done to identity whether the Mozambican 
mineworkers as nationals are treated on equal terms with nationals of South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland which are in similar circumstances and whether the taxes that are imposed 
on the Mozambican mineworkers are not more burdensome than their South African, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland counterparts. This is necessary to established whether the 1964 labour 
agreement is in contravention of Article 24 of both the OECD and UN MTC. 
 
‘The general principle of non-discrimination in the treatment of a country’s citizens is often 
enshrined in the country’s constitutional law or human rights legislation. In the taxation context, 
discrimination can be regarded as the unfavourable treatment of a taxpayer in comparison with 
another taxpayer or category of taxpayers in respect of the same taxable item(s) and in the same 
circumstances.’99 
 
“Discrimination” has been broadly defined as:  
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‘the equal treatment of different cases or the unequal treatment of comparable cases. In an 
international tax context discrimination most often takes the form of different treatment of 
taxpayers whose situations are comparable except in respect of a characteristic such a 
nationality.’100 
 
‘Article 24 of the OECD model DTA contains a non-discrimination clause that prevents partner states 
from discriminating between its nationals and enterprises and those nationals of other states in 
applying the provisions of the DTA between the two states.’101 
 
‘On closer analysis of the non-discrimination clause, it might indicate infringement on the right of 
equality of our nationals/citizens as enshrined in section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. However, non-discrimination and equality differ completely. In fact infringement 
on the right to equality might be justified but discrimination cannot be justified.’102   
 
Neither of the OECD and UN MTCs provide a definition for ‘discrimination’ or ‘non-discrimination’. 
Article 24 of the OECD MTC does not guarantee fair or equitable tax treatment of Mozambican 
nationals of the Contracting State (Mozambique) but merely ensures that these nationals are not 
treated more harshly in terms of taxing their income than the nationals of the other Contracting 
State (South Africa). As a result the basic fairness of the South African tax system cannot be 
questioned.103  
 
Article 24 of both the OECD and UN MTCs apply to every kind of taxes between nationals and 
enterprises and not just those mentioned under the tax treaty. It will therefore, cover taxes like Pay 
as You Earn, Value-Added Tax and the Skills Development Levy 
 
7.1 Article 24 of the OECD MTC  
 
The non-discrimination rule in Article 24 (1) of the OECD model DTA states: 
‘Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any 
taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burdensome than 
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the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other State in the same 
circumstances in particular with respect to residence, are or may be subjected. This provision 
shall, notwithstanding the provision of Article 1 also apply to persons who are not residents 
of one or both of the contracting State.’104 
 
‘The non-discrimination principle embodied in Article 24(1) therefore turns on the nationality of a 
taxpayer and not the taxpayer’s residence.’105 
 
Insofar as Article 24 is concerned, South Africa can legitimately discriminate between residents and 
non-residents of South Africa (who may be residents of Mozambique). But South Africa cannot 
discriminate between its nationals and nationals of Mozambique who are in the same circumstances 
as its nationals. Article 24(1) tells us that, in evaluating the circumstances of two taxpayers (one a 
national of Mozambique) and the other (a national of South Africa), we must take into account 
especially the circumstances of each national’s residence.106 
 
Therefore, discrimination on the grounds of nationality exists only where nationality, and nothing 
else, is the decisive criterion for the taxpayer being treated less favourably under South Africa’s 
domestic law. Conversely, if South Africa treats a national of Mozambique less favourably than its 
own nationals for reasons other than nationality (i.e. the criterion warranting the different tax 
treatment is one other than nationality), there is no violation of Article 24 (1) of the OECD model 
DTA. Hence, one particular circumstance that does not fall under Article 24 (1) is less favourable 
treatment of non-residents of South Africa, even if they are nationals of Mozambique. Thus only 
nationals of South Africa who are resident in Mozambique (being in the same circumstances as the 
taxpayers in question who are not nationals of South Africa) are the basis of comparison.107 
 
For example, under Article 24 (1) there is no discrimination in its tax treatment if South Africa taxes 
the income of non-residents at a higher rate than the income of residents of South Africa. This is 
because Article 24(1) requires non-discriminatory treatment of nationals of the two states in like 
circumstances.108 
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Therefore, a national of Mozambique who is a non-resident of South Africa must be treated in the 
same way as a national of South Africa who is a non-resident of South Africa and also a resident of 
Mozambique. Since the tax law of South Africa, which imposes a higher tax rate on non-residents of 
South Africa, applies equally to non-residents who are nationals of Mozambique and to non-
residents who are nationals of another Country, both nationals are treated in the same way.109 
 
According to Article 1 of the OECD MTC the provisions of the DTA would only apply to a resident of a 
contracting State. Therefore, for Article 24(1) to operate it should refer to nationals. Therefore, 
Article 24(1) should override Article 1 in that respect. In its definition, Article 24(1) does that.110  
 
‘Both the OECD and UN MTCs define the term ‘national’ in Article 3 as: 
(i) any individual possessing the nationality or citizenship of that Contracting State; and 
(ii) any legal person, partnership or association deriving its status as such from the laws in force 
in that Contracting State.’111 
 
Therefore, the concept of nationality will be defined according to the contracting State’s domestic 
law. In respect of individuals that will be the law that defines nationality or citizenships.112 
 
Therefore, the question should be asked whether the tax laws of a contracting State discriminates 
between two persons solely on the basis that one is a national and the other person is a non- 
national. For example, under the domestic law of South Africa, nationals are given an allowance if 
they reside in a specific geographic area, non-nationals of Mozambique should qualify for the same 
relief provided that they reside in the same area.113 
 
7.2 Non-discrimination – South African mineworkers, BLS & Mozambican mineworkers 
 
Article 24(1) specifies that the tax and its related requirements imposed by South Africa on nationals 
of Mozambique cannot be ‘other or more burdensome than’ that imposed on South Africa’s own 
nationals in the same circumstances as Mozambique’s nationals. In so far as the imposition of tax is 
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concerned this means first that the tax imposed on the Mozambique nationals must be the same tax 
to which South African nationals are subjected.114 
 
In respect of the Mozambique mineworkers they are not subject to any direct taxes on income 
earned in South Africa for a maximum period of 18 months. The South African mine workers will be 
taxed on their income for this period if they are above the annual tax threshold. 
 
The Mozambican mineworkers tax liability is therefore not more burdensome than that of South 
African mineworkers in the same position. 
 
The mineworkers from Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho are treated differently on taxes levied 
upon them compared to Mozambican mineworkers in the same circumstances. It can be argued that 
the mineworkers from these States appear to be exempt from any taxes on income received in 
South Africa due to the fact that the labour agreements of these States stipulate that the 
Government of South Africa has the obligation to deduct taxes from these mineworkers and remit it 
to Governments of their respective States. In case of the Mozambican labour agreement no such 
provision exists and it only stipulates that the Mozambican mineworkers will be exempt from any 
taxes in South Africa. It is submitted that there is no discrimination between mineworkers from 
these States and mineworkers from Mozambique. The tax liability of mineworkers from Swaziland, 
Botswana and Lesotho is also not more burdensome than that of the South African mineworkers in 
the same position. 
 
Article 24(1) further stipulates that nationals of South Africa who are residents of Mozambique 
(being in the same circumstances as the Mozambican mineworkers who are not nationals of South 
Africa and are also residents of Mozambique) are the basis of comparison.115 
 
According to the OECD commentary on Article 24(1) the underlying question is whether two persons 
who are residents of the same State are being treated differently solely by reason of having a 
different nationality.  
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As both the South African mineworkers and Mozambican mineworkers are residents of 
Mozambique, it is submitted that the South African mineworkers are treated differently solely by 
having a different nationality.   
 
This is based on the fact that the 1964 labour agreement is only applicable to Mozambican 
mineworkers and the exemption on any direct taxes payable in South Africa is only available to the 
Mozambican mineworkers. In giving relief from any direct taxes to the Mozambican mineworkers, 
South Africa distinguishes between its own nationals resident in Mozambique and the Mozambican 
mineworkers resident in Mozambique. The same treatment is therefore not afforded to its nationals 
that reside in Mozambique.  
 
This would amount to discrimination against the South African mineworkers that are resident in 
Mozambique unless South Africa extend to the South African mineworkers the same treatment 
afforded to the Mozambican mineworkers. 
 
It further stipulates that Article 24(1) is not restricted to nationals who are solely residents of a 
Contracting State, but on the contrary, extends to all nationals of each Contracting State, whether or 
not they be residents of one of them. In other words, all nationals of a Contracting State are entitled 
to invoke the benefit of this provision as against the other Contracting State. This holds well, in 
particular, for nationals of the Contracting States who are not residents of either of them but of a 
third State.116 
 
This can be applied to mineworkers from the BLS (Botswana, Lesotho & Swaziland) or any other 
mineworker which is a national of their State of origin but is resident in Mozambique. These 
mineworkers are therefore entitled to invoke the discrimination clause in Article 24(1) against the 
other Contracting State which is South Africa. Unless the same treatment is afforded to these 
mineworkers by South Africa as stipulated in the 1964 labour agreement, this would amount to 
discrimination against the mineworkers resident in Mozambique.    
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The 1964 labour agreement between South Africa and Portugal is quite unique in a sense that the 
income received by the Mozambican mineworkers are exempt from tax in South Africa for the 
duration of the contract (usually up to maximum of 18 months) entered into by the Mozambican 
mineworkers and their South African employers although the source of the income is in South Africa.  
 
‘The DTC between South Africa and Mozambique cannot impose tax where the income is not subject 
to tax under domestic legislation. As a result, even where a treaty does give South Africa the right to 
tax the income from the Mozambique workers in respect of employment in South Africa the 
exemption provided for in domestic law renders this right ineffective.’117 
 
There would be a revenue loss to South Africa in respect of the Mozambican mineworkers that 
regularly renew their contracts as they will make use of the exemption provision in the 1964 labour 
agreement. In most cases these workers will be earning a salary that is above the annual tax 
threshold. In respect of the Mozambican mineworkers that entered into contracts for the first time 
there would be no revenue loss to South Africa as their earnings in most cases would not be above 
the annual tax threshold.  
 
In the event that there is double taxation as a result of the 1964 labour agreement between the two 
countries the tax sparing clause makes provision that the tax residents of each country could benefit 
from this provision should each country have reductions or exemptions for foreign investors. The 
1964 labour agreement is seen as a scheme for the promotion of economic development for both 
South Africa and Mozambique and the tax sparing clause can be applied to both countries. This may 
lead to double non-taxation of the South African source income in both countries. 
 
Article 4(3)(b) of the MoU stipulates that member states of the SADC will endeavour to avoid 
‘introducing tax legislation that prejudices another Member State’s economic policies, activities, or 
the regional mobility of goods, services, capital or labour. It is clear that article 4(3)(b) refers to the 
                                                             
117




harmful effects of tax competition’. It is submitted that the 1964 agreement which is given effect in 
terms of section 10(1)(c)(v) of the Act, prejudices the other Member States within the SADC region. 
 
Mineworkers from Mozambique will prefer to apply their services in the mining sector of South 
Africa due to the favourable position of their income being exempt from income tax for the duration 
of their contract. They would not in all likelihood apply their services in other Member States of the 
SADC region where their income would be taxed. The other Member States suffer a significant 
detriment as a result thereof and would be prejudiced. In this instance there will be harmful tax 
competition. 
 
The ‘ring-fencing’ of a regime from the domestic economy in favour of non-resident taxpayers is 
often a clear indication that a country is engaged in harmful tax competition. Taxpayers that are 
incorporated into the regime enjoy the benefit of the infrastructure of the country providing the 
preferential tax regime, without necessarily incurring the cost of the infrastructure. This can be 
applied to the 1964 agreement. The agreement can be classified as ‘regimes that restrict the 
benefits to non-resident taxpayers’,118 which in this instance is the Mozambican mineworkers. This 
kind of ring-fencing is included in article 4(3)(a) of the MoU. The effect of ring-fencing is that 
taxpayers are relieved from the burden of paying taxes (usually at a relatively high rate) in the 
country of residence.119 In this instance the income of the Mozambican mineworkers is exempt from 
income tax for the duration of their contracts. 
 
The 1964 bilateral labour agreement between South Africa and Mozambique appears to be in 
default of Article 21 and 22 of the SADC treaty which seeks co-operation of Member States in 
taxation matters and to harmonise the tax regimes in the SADC region. There is no uniform 
agreement on matters of tax incentives to particular taxpayers in the SADC Member States. This is 
due to the tax incentives provided to the Mozambican mineworkers. In terms of sub - article 3(a) of 
article 4 of the MoU this is evidence of harmful tax competition. 
 
On the other hand it should be noted that the main objective of the SADC treaty is to seek regional 
integration of Member States in Southern Africa especially the poorest members like Mozambique. 
In some way the 1964 labour agreement between South Africa and Portugal goes a long way in 
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achieving that objective as it would help attract investment in Mozambique which will have a 
significant impact on the Mozambican economy. 
 
Article 24(1) of the OECD MTC is identical to Article 23(1) of the DTC between South Africa and 
Mozambique on non-discrimination of nationals. The Mozambican workers do not carry a heavier 
tax burden than the South African nationals due to no taxes being levied by South Africa for a 
maximum of 18 months. The non-discrimination article therefore does not apply. There would be no 
discrimination between mineworkers from Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho and mineworkers from 
Mozambique. The tax liability of mineworkers from these states is also not more burdensome than 
that of the South African mineworkers in the same position. There would be discrimination against 
the South African mineworkers that are resident in Mozambique as the 1964 labour agreement only 
refers to Mozambican mineworkers. 
 
It is submitted that the 1964 labour agreement will fall short on the unconstitutional aspects of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. As stated previously the Bill of Rights applies to 
Mozambican mineworkers that are resident in South Africa. The unconstitutional aspects relates to 
the compulsory deferred pay which compels the workers to defer 60% of net earnings to a central 
bank of Mozambique and exemption from taxes in South Africa compared to South African workers 
in general. The agreement raises the question of discrimination as envisaged in section 9 of the Bill 
of Rights which contains the provisions of equality. 
 
It is submitted that SARS should provide a clear interpretation of the 1964 labour agreement. This is 
important as it would give a clear indication whether the Mozambican mineworkers that regularly 
renew their employment contracts can make use of the exemption of taxes provision in this 
agreement. Due to the current BEPS environment worldwide this would even become more 
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